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Assessing the Merits of Network Neutrality
Obligations at Low, Medium and High
Network Layers
Rob Frieden*
The United States Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
has issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPRM") that would
codify rules aiming to preserve a free and open Internet for consumers.
The NPRM concentrates on the relationship between end users and
Internet Service Providers ("ISPs"), but also solicited comments on
whether the Commission should apply one or more Internet openness
principles as obligations on providers of content, applications, and
services. Extending network neutrality2 obligations "over the top" 3 of
* Pioneers Chair and Professor of Telecommunications and Law, The
Pennsylvania State University; email: rmf5@psu.edu.
1. Preserving the Open Internet, 24 F.C.C.R. 13064 (proposed Oct. 22, 2009); 74
Fed. Reg. 228 at 62637 (Nov. 30, 2009) [hereinafter cited as Open Internet NPRM] (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8).
2. Network neutrality refers to the imposition of nondiscrimination, transparency
and other requirements on ISPs designed to foster a level competitive playing field
among content providers and to establish consumer safeguards so that Internet users have
unrestricted access limited only by legitimate concerns such as ISP network management
See Rob Frieden, A Primer on Network Neutrality, 43
and national security.
INTERECONOMICS: REVIEW OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC POLICY, No. 1 4, 4-7 (2008).
3. In the Open System Interconnection ("OSI") model, layered network
architecture for packet networks typically consists of seven layers: physical,
data link, network, transport, session, presentation and application. The model
calls for the independent operation of the layers, and supports the interaction of
various applications and equipment that is designed to address separately each
layer in a product offering. In the Transport Control Protocol ('TCP')-IP
model, only four levels are used: link (combines OSI physical and data link
levels), network, transport and application (combines OSI session, presentation
and application levels). The functions supported at each layer are as follows:
physical-represents electrical signaling, modulation, etc.; data link-moves
packets (also called 'datagrams') between hosts based on a protocol such as
Ethernet, Asynchronous Transfer Mode, frame relay; network-defines how
data is routed between hosts over one or several networks, often based on IP;
transport-establishes the connection between two hosts, creating a "virtual"
network, often based on TCP or Universal Datagram Protocol; sessioncontrols the setup and termination of communications sessions; presentation-
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ISP traffic transmission links to and from content providers would apply
an ill-advised and jurisdictionally suspect regulatory model.4 While the
FCC's public interest mandate may support some consumer protection
regulatory safeguards against anticompetitive and discriminatory conduct
of facilities-based ISPs, the Commission has no legal basis to regulate
content providers and meddle with the robustly competitive marketplace
for content and services.'
The FCC's initiative responds to concerns about the behavior of
ISPs in their capacity as first and last mile providers of Internet access
and as intermediaries between consumers and sources of content,
applications, and services. Empirical and anecdotal evidence6 prompted
the FCC to consider the need for enforceable rules to ensure that ISPs do
not engage in anticompetitive behavior masquerading as legitimate
network management, or otherwise reduce the spillover benefits accruing
However, no such evidence points to any
from Internet access.
defines the format of the data exchanged (e.g., text, graphic); applicationdefines how applications communicate with each other over the network (e.g.,
e-mail) using various protocols.
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and
Services, 19 F.C.C.R. 15676 n.181 (proposed August 9, 2004). See also Joshua L.
Mindel & Douglas C. Sicker, Leveraging the EU Regulatory Framework to Improve a
Layered Policy Model for US Telecommunications Markets, 30 TELECOMM. POL'CY 136,
137 (2006); Douglas C. Sicker & Lisa Blumensaadt, Misunderstanding the Layered
Model(s), 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 299 (2006); David P. Reed, Critiquingthe
Layered Regulatory Model, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 281 (2006); Lawrence
B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle:Internet Architecture and the Law, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 815 (2004); Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward:
Formulating a New Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network
Layers Model, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 587 (2004); Rob Frieden, Adjusting the Horizontal
and Vertical in Telecommunications Regulation: A Comparison of the Traditionaland a
New LayeredApproach, 55 FED. COMM, L.J. 207 (2003).
4. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (FCC deemed unable
to bar Comcast from interfering with its customers' use of peer-to-peer networking
applications, because the Commission failed to show how its claim of jurisdiction was
reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of its statutorily mandated
responsibilities).
5. After issuing its Open Internet NPRM, the FCC, in a separate Notice of Inquiry
assessing ways to promote broadband development, stated that it "generally does not
regulate Internet content and applications." Framework for Broadband Internet Service,
Notice of Inquiry, GN Docket No. 10-127, 1 1, FCC 10-114 (rel. June 17, 2010);
availableat http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-10-1 14Al.doc.
6. Madison River Commc'n, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295, 4297 (2005) (small independent
telephone company agreed to a $15,000 monetary forfeiture and consent decree agreeing
not to block Digital Subscriber Link customers' access to Voice over the Internet
Protocol telephone services); Formal Complaint of Free Press & Public Knowledge
Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028 (2008), rev'd, Comcast Corp., 600
F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
7. Spillovers refers to positive consequences, externalities in the economic
vernacular, resulting from a specific transaction that benefits third parties. See Brett M.
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dysfunction in the marketplace for content, applications, and services

available via the Internet.
The marketplace of ideas available via the Internet is as vigorous
and open as any medium of communications so long as facilities-based
intermediaries cannot use the excuse of network management
requirements to pursue anticompetitive and harmful strategies requiring
interference with the flow of traffic upstream from content sources and
downstream to end users. The FCC and other national regulatory
authorities ("NRAs") have acknowledged the different characteristics of
network access vis-i-vis the content and applications that ride over ISP
transmission links. While the content and applications marketplace
offers unlimited options, consumers may have only one or two viable
broadband Internet access options.
NRAs and national legislatures need to act with caution in their
assessment of what should be done to preserve an open Internet because

statutory authority typically limits the degree of lawful regulation of
Internet services and the higher layers of Internet-mediated services do
not require the kinds of consumer safeguards telecommunications
regulatory agencies can provide. The potential for anticompetitive and
otherwise harmful conduct lies in the terms and conditions imposed by
ISPs that do not operate in a vigorously competitive marketplace for first
and last mile services. Facilities-based ISPs have both the incentive and
ability to operate non-neutral networks that may not serve the public
interest, particularly with respect to their ability to provide content
origination and termination services facing limited competition coupled

Frischmann, Speech, Spillovers, and the First Amendment, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 301,
310-12 (2008); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
257 (2007).
8. See John B. Horrigan, Broadband Adoption and Use in America, Federal
Communications Commission, Omnibus Broadband Initiative (OBI) Working Paper
Series No. 1 (Feb. 2010), availableat http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/
DOC-296442Al.pdf. The Consumer Survey found that 35 percent of adult Americans do
not have high-speed Internet connections at home-or approximately 80 million adults
and 13 million children over the age of five. Id. For the 65 percent with Internet access,
the vast majority use a cable modem or Digital Subscriber Line connection. Id. "The
simple fact is that our broadband market is a duopoly. Nationwide, incumbent phone and
cable companies control 97 percent of the fixed-line residential broadband market. When
the mobile data market is included, the incumbent phone and cable companies'
nationwide market share only declines to 95 percent. . . ." Inquiry Concerning the
Deployment of GN, Docket No. 09-137 Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as
Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, Comments of Free Press at 46 (Sept.
4, 2009), available at http://www.ncta.com/PublicationType/RegulatoryFiling/NCTAComments- 11-12-09.aspx.
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with the fact that end users typically rely on only one carrier to provide a
single link to and from the Internet cloud.9
The need to investigate and possibly remedy problems in the terms,
conditions, and nature of consumers' access to the Internet does not
provide the FCC with the basis for an unprecedented expansion of its
regulatory wingspan to regulate content and applications that traverse
networks. Ample case law supports the premise that the FCC has no
basis to impede and regulate Internet-mediated content and services.' 0
The FCC has questionable authority even to remedy discriminatory and
intrusive meddling of subscribers' links to and from sources of content."
Network neutrality objectives never have extended upstream to sources
of content and software because consumers have unlimited choices of
options, subject only to the constraints imposed by ISPs in their capacity
as intermediaries and operators of the sole means for end users to access
the Internet.
The often contentious network neutrality debate typically cleaves along an absolute foror-against dichotomy based largely on one's philosophy about the Internet's past and
future direction, the ability of marketplace forces to promote self-regulation, and the
degree of confidence in governments' ability to remedy acute problems. Such a
macroscopic perspective promotes a large difference of opinion with plenty of
opportunities to disparage the opposition. Thoughtful scholarly literature, which can
examine nuances in the debate, may become subordinate to svonsored research designed
to influence policymakers with a preconceived point of view. A "big picture" analysis
ironically leads to viewpoints at polar opposites and advocacy that finds no middle
ground.

The issue of whether the Internet requires some degree of
government oversight, dispute resolution and stewardship requires
serious consideration, rather than sloganeering and dueling web pages. 13
An essential element for such analysis breaks down the Internet into at
least three layers having different characteristics that can affect the
9. The Internet cloud refers to the vast array of interconnected networks that make
up the Internet and provide users with seamless connectivity to these networks and the
content available via these networks. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cloud-computing.
"The increasing functionality of the Internet is decreasing the role of the personal
computer. This shift is being led by the growth of "cloud computing"-the ability to run
applications and store data on a service provider's computers over the Internet, rather
than on a person's desktop computer." William Jeremy Robison, Free at What Cost?:
Cloud Computing Privacy Under The Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195,
1199 (April, 2010).
10. See infra Sec. V and accompanying notes.
11. See supra note 4.
12. See, e.g., Netcompetition.org, Pro Net Competition: Studies and Reports,
http://netcompetition.org/index.php/go/pro-net-competition-studies-and-reports
(last
visited Aug. 28, 2010); Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal and Economic Public Policy
Studies, Network Neutrality, http://www.phoenix-center.org/rtl.html (last visited Aug.
28, 2010).
13. Compare Save the Internet, http://www.savetheinternet.com with Net
Competition.Org, http://www.netcompetition.org/.
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arguments for or against the application of network neutrality rules. A
physical layer provides the infrastructure needed to establish a basic
communications link between two or more parties. Ridding on top of
this basic bitstream transmission conduit are communications protocols
and standards like the Transmission Control Protocol that manage the
routers that select networks to carry traffic and the Internet Protocol that
establishes a globally used addressing system. Farther atop the physical
layer and the layers that set up and process transmissions are the content,
applications and software that provide various services.
This article will consider the network neutrality debate in the
context of these three different layered components of the Internet. The
article will show that compelling arguments for enforceable network
neutrality rules are strongest at the low layer, contestable at the middle
layer and unnecessary at the high layer. Such a nuanced view of network
neutrality explains that the need for government involvement depends on
which part of the Internet's networking infrastructure one examines. For
those comfortable with government involvement and network neutrality
rules, this article will challenge the need for such oversight in the
competitive marketplace for Internet-mediated content, applications and
software. For others uncomfortable with any government involvement,
this article will identify instances where market failure and the lack of
competition necessitate the availability of an authorized referee to
require fair dealing by a limited number of operators providing Internet
access. In the middle layers, where ISPs not only use protocols and
technologies to manage their networks, but possibly also to favor
corporate affiliates and certain third party providers of content, this
article suggests the need for a government referee authorized to resolve
disputes and to examine causes of congestion and service interruptions.
I.

ABSENT A NEW LEGISLATIVE MANDATE, THE FCC LACKS CERTAIN
JURISDICTION TO REGULATE ALL LAYERS OF INTERNET-MEDIATED
SERVICES.

Throughout the FCC's comprehensive explanation of how the
Internet has become a successful medium of communication, along with
the Commission's efforts to promote access, the Open Internet NPRM
concentrates on the relationship of end users upstream to the Internet
cloud via facilities-based ISPs:
The rules we propose today address users' ability to access the
Internet and are not intended to regulate the Internet itself or create a
different Internet experience from the one that users have come to
Instead, our proposals attempt to build on existing
expect.

policies ... that have contributed to the Internet's openness without
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imposing conditions that might diminish innovation or network
investment. 14
Wisely, the FCC has left the application and content layers essentially
unregulated. This has helped enable an incredible outpouring of
innovation and creativity online.
However, as part of its Open Internet NPRM, the FCC asked
whether it should depart from this approach and apply openness
principles to Internet content and applications as well. The FCC cannot
lawfully extend its regulatory wingspan to impose enforceable rules and
regulation for two primary reasons. First, the D.C. Circuit Court's
opinion in Comcast Corp. v. FCC severely limits any extension of
ancillary jurisdiction15 toward Internet-mediated information services,16
despite evidence of congressional intent and a broad public interest

14. Open Intemet NPRM, supra note 1, at 13068 (proposed Oct. 22, 2009).
"Broadband Internet access service providers have an incentive to use this gatekeeper
role to make it more difficult or expensive for end users to access services competing
with those offered by the network operator or its affiliates." Id. at 13094.
15. The FCC relies on a claim of ancillary jurisdiction when the Commission lacks
explicit statutory authority. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 649 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
The FCC successfully invoked ancillary jurisdiction to regulate cable television even
before the Commission received a statutory mandate to do so. Id.
The FCC needed a hook to assert jurisdiction over cable. To reach that goal, it
used a two-step process. First, the Commission found that cable was within its
primary statutory grant of authority under section 152(a) of the
[Communications] Act, which allows the FCC to regulate 'all interstate and
foreign communication by wire or radio.' Second, the FCC invoked section
303(r) of the Act, which allows the Commission to issue 'such rules and
regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with
law,' as 'public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.' The FCC also
referenced section 154(i), which provides that '[t]he Commission may perform
any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not
inconsistent with [the Communications Act], as may be necessary in the
execution of its functions.'
Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 535, 572 (Mar. 2010) (citations
omitted). The Supreme Court affirmed the FCC's claim of ancillary jurisdiction. United
States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). See also FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.,
440 U.S. 689 (1979) (Midwest Video II); United States v. Midwest Video Corp.,406 U.S.
649 (1972) (Midwest Video I); James B. Speta, The Shaky Foundations of the Regulated
Internet, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101 (Winter 2010); John Blevins, Jurisdiction
as Competition Promotion: A Unified Theory of the FCC's Ancillary Jurisdiction, 36
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 585 (Summer 2009); Andrew Gioia, FCC Jurisdiction Over ISPs in
Protocol-Specific Bandwidth Throttling, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 517

(Spring 2009).
16. Information service is defined as "the offering of a capability for generating,
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available
information via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not
include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service." 47
U.S.C. § 153(20) (2010).
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mandate that may support reasonable efforts to promote consumer
freedom by overseeing the conduct of facilities-based ISPs. Second, any
residual legal or policy rationale for regulating ISPs that survives the
Comcast decision does not apply to content and application providers.
Operators at the network level provide an essential link between
ends users and sources of content and applications. Consumers generally
have limited options available and typically select one and only one
operator to provide all access services. The lack of competitive options,
coupled with sole reliance on one origination and termination carrier for
most individual subscribers, accrues ample market power for ISPs that
possess both the incentive and ability to abuse this power, particularly
when vertically integrated ISPs offer subscribers content and applications
that compete with what unaffiliated ventures have available.
The FCC has no basis to depart from its longstanding policy that
recognizes the competitive and operational distinctions between
facilities-based providers and those services that depend on networks to
reach end-users. Consistent with its statutory mandates, the Commission
could apply regulatory oversight where facilities-based, first and lastmile providers have the incentive and power to use their control in
network infrastructure in ways that could interfere with competition and
innovation in services that depend on this infrastructure. Content and
applications, riding on top of network links, qualify for non-regulation in
light of the fact that these layers operate competitively and must rely on
the telecommunications services 17 of carriers possibly subject to
regulatory oversight. Ventures offering content and applications operate
in a robustly competitive marketplace, limited only by the network
bottleneck through which all content and applications must traverse.
Applying network neutrality principles to the vibrant application and
content markets would endanger the open Internet because of the real
potential for such regulations to stifle innovation, create disincentives for
investment, and impose unnecessary operating costs.
In the absence of a new statutory mandate to impose network
neutrality rules, the FCC must find a jurisdictional basis in existing law.
The Commission primarily has applied its ancillary jurisdiction based on
Title I of the Communications Act, coupled with the view that other
portions of the Communications Act provide the statutory basis for
affirmative efforts to promote access to the Internet. In light of the
Comcast decision, a reasonable reading of these statutory references
would limit their applicability to ventures that operate wire or radio
17. Telecommunications service is defined as "the offering of telecommunications
for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available
directly to the public, regardless of the facilities used." 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2010).

56

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115:1

conduits as telecommunications service providers and not to information
service providers, or suppliers of Internet-mediated content, software,
and services. Nothing in the statutory provisions cited by the FCC to
justify its regulatory intervention to promote an "Open Internet" provides
any basis for the Commission to extend its regulatory reach to ventures
supplying the content delivered by unaffiliated ISPs.
Lower down in the layers that combine to create Internet services,
the FCC might reclassify Internet access as a telecommunications
service, subject to portions of the available regulations contained in Title
II of the Communications Act.' 8 Such a reclassification surely will
trigger an onslaught of lobbying and litigation,' 9 but it need not impose
burdensome government oversight. The FCC has a congressionally
authorized procedure for streamlining common carrier oversight in light
of precompetitive marketplace conditions that support the use of "lighthanded" regulation.20
A.

The Commission's Statutory Basisfor Applying Network Neutrality
Rules (including Title I, Secs. 201(b), 230(b), and 706(a)) Extend
Only to Ventures that Provide InternetAccess via Wire or Radio.

The FCC recognizes that facilities-based ISPs, operating between
end users downstream and content providers upstream, have the
incentive and ability to engage in practices 2 1 that can frustrate the
18. See FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski, The Third Way: A Narrowly Tailored
Broadband Framework (May 6, 2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-297944Al.doc (proposing to apply Title II regulation
only to the bit transmission portion of ISP services and rejecting a renewed attempt to
find a way to extend Title I ancillary jurisdiction or reclassifying all aspects of Internet
access as a telecommunications service); Austin Schlick, FCC General Counsel, A ThirdWay Legal Frameworkfor Addressing the Comcast Dilemma (May 6, 2010), availableat
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-297945AI.doc (providing legal
rationale for narrow application of selected sections of Title II regulatory authority over
Internet access).
19. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, F.CC. ProposesRules on InternetAccess, N.Y. TIMES,
at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/
May 7, 2010,
technology/07broadband.html.
20. 47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2009) establishes regulatory forbearance criteria for
telecommunications service providers. The FCC can abandon most Title II common
carrier regulatory requirements if it determines that: (1) enforcement of such regulation or
provision is not necessary to ensure that the charges, practices, classifications, or
regulations by, for, or in connection with that telecommunications carrier or
telecommunications service are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably
discriminatory; (2) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary for the
protection of consumers; and (3) forbearance from applying such provision or regulation
is consistent with the public interest. Id.
21. "[E]ven if there is competition among broadband Internet access service
providers, once an end-user customer has chosen to subscribe to a particular broadband
Internet access service provider, this may give that broadband Internet access service
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Internet access goals of both subscribers and content providers, as well as
broader public interest objectives:
In many parts of the United States, customers have limited options
for high-speed broadband Internet access service.
Moreover,
broadband providers generally sell other services-such as voice and
video-that face competition from content and applications offered
by others over the Internet. As a result, broadband providers'
interests in maximizing profits may not always align with the
interests of end users and the public. 22
Broadband Internet access service providers possessing market power
may have an incentive to raise prices charged to content, application,
and service providers and end users. Not only would that harm users
overall, but it could reduce innovation at the edge of the network and
cause some end users to decide not to subscribe to broadband Internet
access service.23
While acknowledging that it "has traditionally focused on providers of
broadband Internet access service,"2 4 the FCC nevertheless invites
comments on the merits of "phrasing one or more of the Internet

provider the ability, at least in theory, to favor or disfavor any traffic destined for that
subscriber." Open Internet NPRM, supranote 1, at 13094 (proposed Oct. 22, 2009).
22. Id. at 13067. The Commission also noted: "The evolution in Internet usage, and
associated developments in network technology, have respectively motivated and enabled
network operators to differentiate price and service for end users and for providers of
content, applications, and services. A significant debate has developed over how best to
preserve the Internet's openness. We thus find it appropriate at this time to evaluate the
need for oversight of broadband Internet access service providers' practices." Id. at
13084.
23. Id. at 13093.
24. Id. at 13103 (citing Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the
Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986, 14988 (2005)); see also
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities
Universal Service Obligations of Broadband Providers, CC Docket No. 02-33; Review of
Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecommunications Services,
CC Docket No. 01-337; Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating
Company Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review
of Computer III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements, CC Docket No. 95-20, 98-10;
Conditional Petition of the Verizon Telephone Companies for Forbearance Under 47
U.S.C. § 160(c) with Regard to Broadband Services Provided Via Fiber to the Premises;
Petition of the Verizon Telephone Companies for Declaratory Ruling or, Alternatively,
for Interim Waiver with Regard to Broadband Services Provided Via Fiber to the
Premises, WC Docket No. 04-242; Consumer Protection in the Broadband Era, WC
Docket No. 05-271; Report and Order and Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R.
14853, 14904 (2005), aff'd, Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC., 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir.
2007).
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openness principles as obligations of other entities, in addition to
providers of broadband Internet access service." 2 5
Simply put, the FCC lacks any jurisdictional basis or compelling
public interest need to impose Internet openness principles or network
neutrality rules on providers of content; even regulation of lower-layer
functions will require the Commission to explain how Internet access has
become the functional equivalent to essential public utility-type
telecommunications service and not optional and presumably
competitive information services. None of the statutory clauses cited by
the Commission to support its assertion of jurisdiction over ISPs can
stretch further to include content providers; the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals did not consider them the basis for even lower layer regulation.
In the Open Internet NPRM, the FCC claims to have ancillary authority
under Title I of the Communications Act to exercise jurisdiction over the
Internet and to implement Federal Internet policy. 26 However, the
Commission elsewhere has acknowledged that ancillary jurisdiction can
apply only "where the Commission has subject matter jurisdiction over
the communications at issue and the assertion of jurisdiction is
reasonably required to perform an express statutory obligation." 2 7 The
FCC does not have open-ended jurisdiction to regulate content, nor does
a claim to regulate aspects of Internet-mediated communications and
information services automatically extend to content carried via Internet
conduits.
Similarly, the FCC cannot credibly read the language in Sections
230(b), and 201(b) of Communications Act, as amended, and Section
706(a) 28 of the Telecommunications Act of 199629 as extending the
25. Open Internet NPRM, supra note 1, at 13104. The FCC appears to make this
request at the recommendation of a single ISP even though the Commission
acknowledges that the 2005 Internet Policy Statement, which contains principles the
Commission now wants to establish as rules, "was placed in five already-opened dockets
dealing with issues relating to Internet access service providers, but it was not placed in
the docket most likely to address content, applications, and services-the IP-Enabled
Services [19 F.C.C.R. 4863 (2004)] docket." Id. at n.223.
26. "We have ancillary jurisdiction over matters not directly addressed in the Act
when the subject matter falls within the agency's general statutory grant of jurisdiction
and the regulation is 'reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the
Commission's various responsibilities.' That test is met with respect to broadband
Internet access service." Open Internet NPRM, supra note 1, at 13099 (quoting United
States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172-73 (1968) (citing United States v. Midwest
Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 662 (1972)); see also Formal Complaint of Free Press and
Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer
Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13033-44 (2008). But cf Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600
F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (rejecting the FCC's extension of ancillary jurisdiction absent
a direct statutory link).
27. IP-Enabled Services, 19 F.C.C.R. 4863, 4895 (2004).
28. Codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a).
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Commission's regulatory wingspan over any Internet-mediated content.
Section 230(b)(1) states that it "is the policy of the United States . . . to

promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive
computer services and other interactive media. ... "o Section 230(b)(2)
states that it "is the policy of the United States . .. to preserve the vibrant
and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and
other interactive computer services," 3 1 which is hardly an explicit or
implicit endorsement of FCC regulation that could impact adversely the
currently vibrant and free marketplace of ideas available via the
Internet.3 2 Section 201(b) of the Communications Act authorizes the
FCC to "prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the
public interest to carry out the provisions of this chapter." 3 3 The FCC
cannot lawfully bootstrap a statutory grant of authority to establish rules
for any substantive area outside the Commission's jurisdiction.
Section 706(a) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 directs the
FCC and state public utility commissions to "encourage the deployment
on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications
capability to all Americans (including, in particular, elementary and
secondary schools and classrooms) by utilizing, in a manner consistent
with the public interest, convenience, and necessity, price cap regulation,
regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local
telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove
barriers to infrastructure investment."3 4 Congress defined advanced
telecommunications capability "without regard to any transmission
media or technology, as high-speed, switched, broadband
telecommunications capability that enables users to originate and receive
high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications using
any technology."35 The statute clearly focuses on promoting access to
the Internet, i.e., the wire and radio facilities used by ISPs to provide first
and last mile Internet access to end users and to provide these users with
the upstream links into the Internet cloud for accessing content,
29. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2008).
30. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1).
31. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).
32. "The dramatic expansion of this new marketplace of ideas ... demonstrates that
the growth of the Internet has been and continues to be phenomenal. As a matter of
constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that
governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free
exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom of
expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of
censorship." Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
33. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b). See also Alliance for Cmty Media v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763,
772-74 (6th Cir. 2008)); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
34. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a).
35. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1).
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applications, and services. Any statutory mandate that the FCC may
construe as authorizing it to regulate the Internet has explicit limits
designed to narrow FCC oversight on enhancing public access to Internet
conduits, whether classified as telecommunications services or
information services.
B.

The D.C. Circuit Court ofAppeals Rejected the FCC'sAncillary
JurisdictionRationale

In rejecting the FCC's attempt to sanction Comcast for interfering
with subscribers' peer-to-peer traffic absent legitimate network
management requirements, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals severely
sidetracked the Commission's attempt to establish binding network
neutrality policies, rules, and regulations absent an explicit legislative
mandate. Noting that the Commission invoked no express statutory
authority, the court considered whether "barring Comcast from
interfering with its customers' use of peer-to-peer networking
applications is 'reasonably ancillary to the . . . effective performance of

Notwithstanding the
its statutorily mandated responsibilities."' 3 6
Supreme Court's broad deference to the FCC's assertion of ancillary
jurisdiction in the Brand X case, where the Court affirmed the FCC's
determination that cable modem-provided Internet access constitutes a
lightly regulated information service, the D.C. Circuit required evidence
that the FCC's regulatory action had a direct link to its statutorily
mandated responsibilities.38 The court vacated the FCC's sanctioning
order of Comcast based on the view that the FCC could only refer to
congressional statements of policy which do not provide a precedent for

36. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing Am. Library
Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
37. The court does not interpret the BrandX case as precedent for the imposition of
plenary authority over any matter involving cable television company provided Internet
access. Id. at 649-650. "By leaping from Brand X's observation that the Commission's
ancillary authority may allow it to impose some kinds of obligations on cable Internet
providers to a claim of plenary authority over such providers, the Commission runs afoul
of Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video I." Id. at 650. "The Commission's exercise of
ancillary authority over Comcast's network management practices must, to repeat, 'be
independently justified."' Id. at 651 (citing Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v.
FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (rejecting the FCC's preemption of state and
local regulation of two-way, intrastate, non-video cable transmissions)).
38. The Commission therefore rests its assertion of authority over Comcast's
network management practices on the broad language of section 4(i) of the Act: "The
Commission may perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue
such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its
functions ... " Id. at 6 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 154(i); Formal Complaint of Free Press &
Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer
Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13036 (2008)).
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creating such responsibilities and to various sections of the
Communications Act that the court deemed inapplicable for substantive
and procedural reasons.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the Commission's
reprimand of Comcast based on the court's refusal to accept the
Commission's claim of ancillary jurisdiction. The court referred to the
three major cable television cases 39 where the Supreme Court had
affirmed the FCC's ancillary jurisdictional claim "at a time when, as with
the Internet today, the Communications Act gave the Commission no
express authority to regulate such systems." 40 As it had done in the case
rejecting the FCC's attempt to require television set manufacturers to
build units capable of processing digital rights management, "broadcast
flags," the court distilled the precedent for ancillary jurisdiction
established by these cases into a two part test whether: "(1) the
Commission's general jurisdictional grant under Title I [of the
Communications Act] covers the regulated subject and (2) the
regulations are reasonably ancillary to the Commission's effective
performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities." 4 1 The court
determined that the FCC had not satisfied the second part of the test. 42
The court flatly rejected the FCC's attempt to infer congressional
intent for the Commission to extend its regulatory wingspan to include
In a series of references to provisions of the
Internet access.
Communications Act,4 3 the Commission expansively read congressional
policy as sufficient ground for undertaking regulatory policy.
Instead, the Commission maintains that congressional policy by itself
creates 'statutorily mandated responsibilities' sufficient to support the
39. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (Midwest Video II);
United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (Midwest Video I); United
States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
40. Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 646.
41. Id. (citing American Library,406 F.3d at 691-692).
42. The court noted that Comcast had conceded "that the Commission's action here
satisfies the first requirement because the company's Internet service qualifies as
'interstate and foreign communication by wire' within the meaning of Title I of the
Communications Act." Id. at 646-647 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 152(a)). The court also
rejected the Commission's claim that because Comcast had used the existence of FCC
jurisdiction in another case the company should be judicially stopped from challenging
the Commission's jurisdiction now. Id. at 648. The court interpreted Comcast's position
in the other case as simply acknowledging the FCC's jurisdiction over wire and radio
services, which includes what Comcast offers. Id. at 648-649. "Because Comcast never
clearly argued in the California litigation that the Commission's assertion of authority
over the company's network management practices would be 'reasonably ancillary to the
Commission's effective performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities,' . . . that
question remains for us to answer." Id. at 649.
43. The Commission cited to §§ 1, 230(b), 706, 257, 201 and 623 of the
Communications Act. Id. at 654.
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exercise of section 4(i) ancillary authority. Not only is this argument
flatly inconsistent with Southwestern Cable, Midwest Video I,
Midwest Video II, and NARUC II, but if accepted it would virtually

free the Commission from its congressional tether."
The court concluded that if the FCC position prevailed, the FCC could
attempt unlawfully to invoke ancillary jurisdiction to apply any number
of regulatory requirements to cable modem provided Internet access
without explicit congressional authority to do so. 4 5
C.

Network Neutrality Rules Can Only Apply to ConduitProviders

If the FCC were to extend binding regulatory obligations on
content, application, and service providers, the Commission surely will
have engaged in an unlawful mission creep, based on "an implausible
reading of the statute, . . . [thereby] exceed[ing] the authority given it by
Congress." 46 Supreme Court Justice Scalia presciently warned that the
FCC as an "experienced agency can (with some assistance from
credulous courts) turn statutory constraints into bureaucratic
discretions,"4 7 reserving, for example, the option of regulating Internet
content based on statutes offering absolutely no basis for anything
beyond promoting Internet access. Nowhere in its previous involvement
with the Internet, or in its regulatory classification of telecommunications
services and information services, has the Commission ever sought to
expand its regulatory mission and the scope of oversight to include
content, software, and services that traverse networks operated by ISPs.
Similarly, nothing in the objectives of network neutrality articulated by
the FCC and others requires that the Commission make an unprecedented
expansion of its jurisdiction ostensibly to achieve the goals articulated by
the Commission in its 2005 Internet Policy StatementA8 and the Open
Internet NPRM.

44. Id. at 655.
45. "Were we to accept that theory of ancillary authority, we see no reason why the
Commission would have to stop [at imposing regulation of Internet Service Providers'
rates], for we can think of few examples of regulations that apply to Title II common
carrier services, Title III broadcast services, or Title VI cable services that the
Commission, relying on the broad policies articulated in section 230(b) and section 1,
would be unable to impose upon Internet service providers." Id.
46. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n. v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 1005
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 1013.
48. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline
Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 Internet Policy
Statement].
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AMPLE CASE LAW FORECLOSES THE FCC FROM LEVERAGING A
PUBLIC INTEREST ARGUMENT TO REGULATE CONTENT,
APPLICATION, AND SOFTWARE PROVIDERS.

Providers of content, applications, and services having no affiliation
with downstream ISPs qualify for maximum protection from FCC
regulation because these ventures do not operate wire or radio networks,
and only use telecommunications bit transport services to deliver their
content and services to end users. The Commission has developed a long
record of establishing a "bright line" regulatory demarcation between
regulated carriers providing telecommunications services and more
broadly wire or radio access on one hand, and unregulated ventures
providing content, applications, and software that ride on top of the
transport services provided by facilities-based operators.
In its Second Computer Inquiry,4 9 the FCC established a regulatory
dichotomy between regulated basic telecommunications services and
unregulated enhanced services based on the potential for facilities-based
carriers to abuse their bottleneck control over access to enhanced
facilities. The Commission created structural safeguards that required
separation between a facility-based carrier's Title II regulated common
carrier services and unregulated services provided by corporate
affiliates.so The Commission subsequently concluded in the Third
Computer Inquiry1 that a single firm could achieve operational
efficiencies without anticompetitive harm by jointly providing basic and
enhanced services. However, this relaxation of structural and functional
separation requirements did not eliminate the dichotomy between
regulated telecommunications services provided by network carriers and
unregulated services.
49. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Second Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), aff'd sub nom.
Computer and Commc'ns Indus. Ass'n. v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
50. "In the Computer II rules, the Commission subjected facilities-based providers to
common-carrier duties not because of the nature of the 'offering' made by those carriers,
but rather because of the concern that local telephone companies would abuse the
monopoly power they possessed by virtue of the 'bottleneck' local telephone facilities
they owned." Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n. v. Brand X Internet Serve., 545 U.S. 967,
996 (2005).
51. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules & Regulations
(Third Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986), vacated sub
nom. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990), on remand, Computer III
Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Safeguards, Notice of ProposedRulemaking &
Order,6 F.C.C.R. 174 (1990), rule modification, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571 (1991), vacated in part
and remanded, California v. F.C.C., 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994), on remand, Computer
III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Servs.,
Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 5692 (1995).
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With enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,52 Congress
mandated continuation of this regulatory dichotomy. The FCC must
continue to apply Title II common carriage requirements on
telecommunications service providers,53 subject to some regulatory
forbearance opportunities where the public interest supports partial
The Commission has limited regulatory oversight
deregulation.54
responsibilities for information service providers, the replacement
classification for enhanced services. 5 5 Neither the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 nor any other law provides the FCC with statutory authority
to regulate the content, applications, and software that traverse the
networks operated by carriers subject to the Commission's jurisdiction.
The holding in American Library Ass'n v. FCC56 provides solid
precedent for the premise that the FCC cannot leverage its ample
statutory authority over facilities-based network operators to extend its
regulatory wingspan to include content and applications that these
carriers deliver. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the FCC
ignored consumers' rights to be free of government intrusion when the
Commission sought to extend its regulatory wingspan to include
electronic devices on consumer premises that receive content and may be
remotely programmed by carriers to process Digital Rights Management
instructions ("broadcast flags") that would limit the copying,
reformatting, and redistribution options available to consumers.
Characterizing the FCC's action as the most sweeping assertion of
authority in the Commission's seven decades of existence, the court
52. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2008).
53. See, e.g., Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio
Service Providers, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22
F.C.C.R. 15817 (2007) (clarifying that automatic roaming is a common carrier obligation
for commercial mobile radio service carriers that requires them to provide roaming
services to other carriers upon reasonable request and on a just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory basis pursuant to Sections 201 and 202 of the Communications Act).
54. 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2008).
55. "Under its Computer Inquiry rules, which foreshadowed the definitions of
'information' and 'telecommunications' services, . . . the Commission forbore from
regulating as common carriers 'value-added networks'-non-facilities-based providers
who leased basic services from common carriers and bundled them with enhanced
services; it said that they, unlike facilities-based providers, would be deemed to provide
only enhanced services." BrandX, 545 U.S. at 1011.
56. American Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The court
wrote that:
In this case, all relevant materials concerning the FCC's jurisdiction-including
the words of the Communications Act of 1934, its legislative history,
subsequent legislation, relevant case law, and Commission practice--confirm
that the FCC has no authority to regulate consumer electronic devices that can
be used for receipt of wire or radio communication when those devices are not
engaged in the process of radio or wire transmission.

Id. at 798.
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rejected the use of ancillary jurisdiction under Title I in lieu of explicit
congressional authorization:
The Commission recognized that it may exercise ancillary
(1) the
jurisdiction only when two conditions are satisfied:
Commission's general jurisdictional grant under Title I covers the
regulated subject and (2) the regulations are reasonably ancillary to
the Commission's effective performance of its statutorily mandated
responsibilities. The Commission's general jurisdictional grant under
Title I plainly encompasses the regulation of apparatus that can
receive television broadcast content, but only while those apparatus
are engaged in the process of receiving a television broadcast. Title I
does not authorize the Commission to regulate receiver apparatus
after a transmission is complete. As a result, the FCC's purported
exercise of ancillary authority founders on the first condition. There
is no statutory foundation for the broadcast flag rules, and
consequently the rules are ancillary to nothing. Therefore, we hold
that the Commission acted outside the scope of its delegated authority
when it adopted the disputed broadcast flag regulations.5 7
The court determined that broadcast flags operate as a curb on the
ability of digital television reception equipment to redistribute digital
broadcast content after having received the content and not during the
Finding no congressional authority for
actual broadcast transmission.
the FCC to regulate consumers' use of already received broadcast
content, the court refused to defer to agency expertise. 59 The court
reasoned that absent the need for explicit congressional authority the
FCC would have plenary authority to regulate any consumer electronics
and computer devices.
The court also rejected the Commission's ancillary jurisdiction rationale
based on the Communications Act. With references to several communications
cases having a judicial endorsement of ancillary jurisdiction, the court noted that

57. Id. at 691-692.
58. "The effectiveness of the broadcast flag regime is dependent on programming
being flagged and on devices capable of receiving broadcast DTV signals (collectively
"demodulator products") being able to recognize and give effect to the flag. Under the
rule, new demodulator products (e.g., televisions, computers, etc.) must include flagrecognition technology. This technology, in combination with broadcasters' use of the
flag, would prevent redistribution of broadcast programming." Id. at 693.
59. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,

(1984). The Supreme Court supported deferral to the expertise of a regulating agency "if
the intent of Congress is clear." 467 U.S. at 842-43. If "Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue," and the agency has acted pursuant to an express
or implied delegation of authority, the agency's statutory interpretation is entitled to
deference, as long as it is reasonable. Id. at 843-44. See also United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
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all prior cases with precedential value involved entities engaged in
"communication by wire or radio":
The Court's decisions in Southwestern Cable, Midwest Video I, and
Midwest Video II were principally focused on the second prong of the

ancillary jurisdiction test. This is unsurprising, because the subject
matter of the regulations at issue in those cases-cable televisionconstituted interstate communication by wire or radio, and thus fell
within the scope of the Commission's general jurisdictional grant
under Title I of the Communications Act. However, these cases
leave no doubt that the Commission may not invoke its ancillary
jurisdiction under Title I to regulate matters outside of the compass of
communication by wire or radio.60
The court also rejected the FCC's rationale that broadcast flag processing
regulations could lawfully fit within the Commission's congressionally
authorized responsibility for promulgating technical requirements for
television receiving equipment as part of its implementation of rules
relating to the transition from analog to digital television.6i
III. THE FCC HAS NEVER STATED IT HAS STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO
REGULATE INTERNET-MEDIATED CONTENT AND SERVICES, EXCEPT
FOR INSTANCES WHERE THE CARRIER OFFERS A RELATED
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE OR IN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
PROVIDES TELECOMMUNICATIONS TO END USERS

Nothing in the FCC's growing involvement with matters pertaining
to the Internet evidences an intention on the Commission's part to extend
its regulatory wingspan to include Internet-mediated content and
services. The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, expressly
limits the FCC's substantive jurisdiction to wire and radio services, such
as broadcasting, telecommunications and cable television services.
Mindful that the information services classification significantly
constrains what it can do to serve the public interest, and aware of the
artificial competitive advantages that accrue from incorrect regulatory

60. ALA, 406 F.3d at 702.
61. The D.C. Circuit wrote:
It is enough here for us to find that the Communications Act of 1934 does not
indicate a legislative intent to delegate authority to the Commission to regulate
consumer electronic devices that can be used for receipt of wire or radio
communication when those devices are not engaged in the process of radio or
wire transmission. That is the end of the matter. It turns out, however, that
subsequent legislation enacted by Congress confirms the limited scope of the
agency's ancillary jurisdiction and makes it clear that the broadcast flag
regulations exceed the agency's delegated authority under the statute.
Id. at 706.
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classification, the FCC has appreciated the need, on occasion, to clarify
what regulatory obligations apply to particular types of operators.
For example, the FCC determined that wireless telecommunications
service providers needed to be reminded of their still applicable Title II
common carrier obligations, including the duty to provide "roaming"
subscribers with access to their networks, on cost-based and
nondiscriminatory terms.6 2 Similarly, the Commission determined that
routing telecommunications services via the Internet does not
automatically convert these services into information services.6 3
Additionally, the Commission has asserted ancillary jurisdiction and has
applied selective regulatory requirements on Voice over the Internet
Protocol ("VoIP") service providers, primarily limited to VolP operators
that provide service to and from the conventional, dial up, public
switched telephone network ("PSTN"). Selective FCC regulation of
information services and VolP offer no foundation for supporting an
expansion of FCC oversight to any other type of Internet-mediated
content, application, or service.
A.

Internet-mediatedTelecommunications Services

The FCC has clearly stated that routing telecommunications service
traffic via the Internet does not provide carriers an automatic "safe
harbor" 64 opportunity to convert their traffic into a less regulated
information service. Remarkably, AT&T, the party identified in the
62. Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Service
Providers, Report and Order and FurtherNotice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R.
15817 (2007).
63. See e.g., Regulation of Prepaid Calling Card Services, Declaratory Ruling and
Report and Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 7290, (2006), rev'd in part, Qwest Services Corp. v.
FCC, 509 F.3d 531, (D.C. Cir. 2007) (affirming the FCC's regulatory determination but
reversing the Commission's different treatment of calling cards that provide access to
VolP versus ones that provide a menu of services and options) [hereinafter cited as
Regulation of Prepaid Calling Card Service Order].
64. A safe harbor constitutes "[aln area or means of protection [or a] provision (as in
a statute or regulation) that affords protection from liability or penalty." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1363 (8th ed. 2004). In light of the lack of a bright line distinction between
regulated telecommunications services and largely unregulated information services,
ventures possibly can secure a competitive advantage through regulatory arbitrage where
ventures seek reduced regulatory oversight by characterizing telecommunications
services as information services. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet
over Cable and Other Facilities, Internet over Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appropriate
Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Cable Facilities,
DeclaratoryRuling and Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4846 (2002).
The FCC defined regulatory arbitrage as "businesses making decisions based on
regulatory classifications rather than on customers' preferences and innovative and
sustainable business plans." Id.; see also Rob Frieden, Regulatory Arbitrage Strategies
and Tactics in Telecommunications, 5 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 227 (2004).
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Open Internet NPRM as suggesting that the FCC regulate Internetmediated content and services, attempted without success to convince the
FCC that calling card long distance telephone services provided by the
company should qualify for the information service safe harbor.65
B.

VoIP Services

Rather than treat VoIP carriers with the same sort of limited
regulatory oversight it applies to information services, the FCC has
saddled certain types of VolP service with some of the regulatory
burdens applied to conventional telephone service. The Commission
reduces the competitive cost advantage6 6 for VoIP service providers,
which offer subscribers telephone calling access to the PSTN based on
the specific characteristics of these services that make them competitive
alternatives to conventional dial up telephone service. These narrow and
specific regulatory incursions stem from the Commission's public
interest concerns about the potential for VoIP service to adversely impact
universal service funding, national security, and consumer expectations
about the safety and convenience features available from telephone
service.
Interconnected VoIP service providers must contribute to universal
service funding,6 7 reconfigure their service to provide wiretapping
capabilities to law enforcement authorities, 68 provide caller location
identification and emergency 911 access,6 9 and offer service to disabled
users. 70 Such service specific regulatory burdens provide no precedent
65. "AT&T asserted that its cards were 'enhanced' because they provided additional
information to the calling party in the form of an advertising message provided by the
retailer of the card. Accordingly, AT&T contended that the cards provide an information
service, rather than a telecommunications service." Regulation of Prepaid Calling Card
Services Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 7291.
66. See Rob Frieden, Neither Fish Nor Fowl: New Strategies for Selective
Regulation ofInformation Services, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 373 (2008).
67. Universal Serv. Contribution Methodology, Report and Order and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 21 F.C.C.R. 7518, 7538 (2006) (extending section 254(d)
permissive authority to require interconnected VoIP providers to contribute to the USF),
reh'g denied, vacated in part on other grounds, Vonage Holding Corp. v. FCC, 489 F.3d
1232 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
68. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act & Broadband Access &
Servs., First Report and Order and FurtherNotice of ProposedRulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R.
14989 (2005), petition for review denied, Am. Council on Educ. v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226
(D.C. Cir. 2006).
69. IP-Enabled Servs., E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service Providers, First
Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 10245 (2005),
petitionfor review denied; Nuvio Corp. v. FCC, 473 F.3d 302 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
70. IP-Enabled Servs., Implementation of Sections 255 and 251(A)(2) of the
Communications Act of 1934, as Enacted by the Telecommunications Act of 1996:
Access to Telecommunications Service, Telecommunications Equipment and Customer
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for a more broad-based extension of FCC regulation over any and all
Intemet-mediated services.
IV. THE FCC's NETWORK NEUTRALITY CONCERNS ADDRESS
INSTANCES WHERE CONDUIT PROVIDERS UNNECESSARILY IMPEDE
END USER INTERNET ACCESS TO CONTENT, APPLICATIONS, AND
SOFTWARE
The FCC has never stated that the goals of preserving an open
Internet and safeguarding consumers require the Commission to extend

legacy regulation onto content, applications, and software. Simply put,
the factors supporting the creation of enforceable openness rules to ISPs
do not exist for extending any such rules to Intemet-mediated content
ISPs operate a bottleneck in their capacity as
and applications.
intermediaries between end users downstream and content and
applications providers upstream. The Commission must safeguard end
user access to the Internet in light of the ability of ISPs to exploit their
bottlenecks in ways that disserve the public interest through
anticompetitive conduct, but also through unnecessarily restrictive,
discriminatory, and intrusive service terms and conditions that are
unnecessary to achieve legitimate network management objectives.
Absent vastly changed circumstances and compelling reasons, the
Commission has expressly stated the intention to maintain "an
established policy of minimal regulation of the Internet and the services
provided over it." 71 In the context of promoting network neutrality, the
Commission's concern about content derives not from an interest in
regulating it to remedy some apparent market failure, but to ensure that
end users can freely access Intemet-mediated content and that content
creators operate on a level competitive playing field when vying for
consumers.
The extensive scholarly and advocacy literature on network
neutrality has concentrated on the ISPs and their relationship
downstream with end users and upstream with content, applications, and
service providers.72 Authors debate whether these carriers have the
Premises Equipment by Persons with Disabilities Telecommunications, Report and
Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 11275 (2007), Order and Public Notice Seeking Comment, 22
F.C.C.R. 18319 (2007) (granting in part and denying in part waivers of the FCC order).
71. IP-Enabled Services, Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4865.
72. See Marvin Ammori, Beyond Content Neutrality: Understanding Content-Based
Promotion of Democratic Speech, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 273 (2009); Sascha D. Meinrath &
Victor W. Pickard, TranscendingNet Neutrality: Ten Steps Toward an Open Internet, 12
J. INTERNET L., No. 6, 1 (2008); Dan G. Barry, The Effect of Video FranchisingReform
on Net Neutrality: Does the Beginning of IP Convergence Mean That It Is Time for Net
Neutrality Regulation, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 421 (2008);

Jennifer L. Newman, Keeping the Internet Neutral: Net Neutrality and Its Role in
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incentive and ability to discriminate, what they can do under the rubric of
network management, and whether consumers and content/applications
providers need FCC safeguards to guard against anticompetitive conduct
The matter of ISPs' relationship with
and other harmful practices.
upstream ventures raises questions whether the FCC needs to establish
rules that prevent prioritization and other preferential treatment of
specific content, e.g., supplied by affiliates, and not whether the Internet
has sufficient supply or competitiveness in the marketplace for content,
74
applications, and services.
Protecting PoliticalExpression on the Internet, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 153

(2008); T. Randolph Beard, Network Neutrality and Industry Structure, 29 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT L.J. 149 (2007); Jerry Brito, A Tale of Two Commissions: Net Neutrality
and Regulatory Analysis, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1 (2007); Rob Frieden, Internet 3.0:
Identifying Problems and Solutions to the Network Neutrality Debate, 1 INT'L J. COMM.,
461 (2007); Rob Frieden, Network Neutrality or Bias?-Handicappingthe Odds for a
Tiered and Branded Internet, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J., No. 2, 171 (2007); Brett
Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Yoo's Frame and What It Ignores: Network
Neutrality and the Economics of an Information Superhighway, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 383
(2007); Amit M. Schejter, "Justice, and Only Justice, You Shall Pursue": Network
Neutrality, the First Amendment and John Rawls's Theory of Justice, 14 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 137 (2007); Tim Wu and Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the
Internet Neutral? Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575 (2007);
Randolph J. May, Net Neutrality Mandates: Neutering the First Amendment in the
DigitalAge, I/S: J. L. & POL'Y INFO. Soc'Y 197 (2007); Howard A. Shelanski, Network
Neutrality: Regulating with More Questions Than Answers, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 23 (2007); Robert E. Litan, Unintended Consequences of Net Neutrality
Regulation, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 533 (2007).

73. Frischmann and Lemley write that:
Shifting to a system where access to and use of the Internet are allocated and
prioritized according to users' willingness and ability to pay ... is also likely to
reduce innovation at the applications level, since more of the value of that
innovation will be transferred to the owners of the network. And encouraging
that applications-level innovation may be more important than encouraging
additional innovation in the network itself. In our view, the social opportunity
costs of allowing network owners to dismantle the Internet's infrastructure
commons may be tremendous but incredibly difficult to measure precisely
because so much of the value generated by the Internet is not fully captured in
market transactions. Preserving Internet spillovers requires preserving network
neutrality.
Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 6, at 298.
74. "In the absence of network neutrality regulation, there is a real threat that
network providers will discriminate against independent producers of applications,
content or portals or exclude them from their network." Barbara van Schewick, Towards
an Economic Frameworkfor Network Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 329, 390 (2007). "Like cable television operators, the telephone company and
cable modem duopolists in the broadband marketplace in almost all cases provide the
sole interactive 'data pipe' into subscribers' homes. They thus have the incentive, given
their integration with broadband content providers, to act as 'gatekeepers' who can 'flick
the switch' on competitors or any other online speakers whom they disfavor." Anthony
E. Varona, Toward a Broadband Public Interest Standard, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 123
(2009).
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The 2005 Internet Policy Statement and the Open InternetNPRM
Concentrate on Users' Rights ofAccess Vis a Vis Conduit
Providers.

Absent the two sentences contained in paragraph 101 of the Open
Internet NPRM, the FCC consistently has considered Internet openness
and the need for regulatory intervention to preserve it solely in terms of
"users' ability to access the Internet . .. [with no] intent[] to regulate the
Internet itself or create a different Internet experience from the one that
users have come to expect." 75 For each of the rules the FCC proposes to
enforce, the Commission expressly limits the scope of enforcement to "a
The Commission
provider of broadband Internet access service."7
properly limits its focus to the ventures able to affect consumer access to
the Internet.
B.

The PotentialforConsumer Harm is Acute When ISPs Seek to Tilt
the Competitive PlayingField by FavoringAffiliated Content
Providersand Services

The marketplace for Internet-mediated content and services operates
competitively, but runs the risk of becoming less so if ISPs can favor
affiliated content providers. When the FCC sanctioned Comcast for
unnecessarily meddling with subscriber traffic, the Commission
identified a situation where an ISP acted on its incentive and ability to tilt
the competitively playing field to disadvantage a competitive alternative
to the company's video on demand services:
Peer-to-peer applications, including those relying on BitTorrent, have
become a competitive threat to cable operators such as Comcast
because Internet users have the opportunity to view high-quality
video with BitTorrent that they might otherwise watch (and pay for)
on cable television. Such video distribution poses a particular
competitive threat to Comcast's video-on-demand ("VOD") service.
VOD ... operates much like online video, where Internet users can
select and download or stream any available program without a
schedule and watch it any time, generally with the ability to fastforward, rewind, or pause the programming.77
More generally, the Commission has acknowledged that:

75. 31 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 1,at 13068.
76. Id. at 13128.
77. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast
Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13030
(2008) [hereinafter Comcast Investigation].
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a broadband Internet access service provider that is also a pay
television provider could charge providers or end users more to
transmit or receive video programming over the Internet in order to
protect the broadband Internet access service provider's own pay
television service. Alternatively, such a broadband Internet access
service provider could seek to protect its pay television service by
degrading the performance of video programming delivered over the
Internet by third parties. The result may be higher prices or worse
service for some content and applications and inefficiently low
investment in some content and application markets.78

C.

ISPs Can Combine Vertical Integration of Conduit and Content
with the Power to Inspect, Drop, Prioritize,and Otherwise
DifferentiateBit Streamsfor Both Lawful Network Management
Reasons and to PursueAnticompetitive and Other Strategies that
Harm Consumers

Unlike content providers upstream, an ISP can operate as "a
gatekeeper to the content, applications, and services offered on the
Internet." 7 9 The Commission acknowledges that ISPs "have an incentive
to use this gatekeeper role to make it more difficult or expensive for end
users to access services competing with those offered by the network
operator or its affiliates."8 0 This gatekeeper power provides ISPs with
the capacity to constrain, prioritize, discriminate, and otherwise shape
traffic to achieve proper or improper objectives. If the Commission does
not rein in such anticompetitive practices, recent decisions by the
Supreme Court severely restrict the relief available through judicial
appeals.
The ISP gatekeeper function grows more powerful in light of the
ability to use packet inspection techniques to "sniff' and identify types of
traffic that the ISP wants to favor or handicap. "An ISP able to examine
packets for purposes of assigning bitstreams into various tiers of service
78.

Open Internet NPRM, supra note 1, at 13094.

79.
80.

Id.
Id.

81. The Supreme Court has concluded that because industry sector-specific
legislation provides the FCC with authority to craft regulatory remedies, when the
Commission refuses to act, appellate courts have no legal basis for imposing additional
antitrust safeguards. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co., v. Linkline Commc'ns., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109
(2009) (holding that where the FCC has failed to investigate and remedy an instance
where the wholesale price exceeds the retail price of service, courts have a severely
limited basis to investigate further); Verizon Commc'ns., Inc. v. Law Office of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (holding that antitrust laws offer no additional
safeguards when the FCC refuses to apply more aggressive safeguards available in the
Communications Act, as amended).
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also provides an ISP with greater knowledge about the nature and type of
the traffic it handles. Arguably, an ISP engaging in quality of service. . .
and price discrimination through deep packet inspection no longer
operates as a neutral conduit lacking actual or constructive knowledge of
what the packets represent. ISPs that sniff packets actively examine the
header of packets that provide traffic routing information, but also can
identify characteristics of the content 'payload' contained in the

packet." 8 2
ISPs have found it commercially advantageous to combine their
conduit role with various activities relating to the creation, packaging,
and offering of content via the Internet. For example, cable television
companies blend their Internet access conduit function as a provider of
cable modem service, with various video program services that the
companies own or have an affiliate relationship. Similarly, wireless
mobile telephone companies, provide both Internet access, but also
showcase and provide easier access to a packaged collection of Internetmediated content in what is commonly referred to as a "walled garden."83
The Commission appreciates the potentially adverse impact on
consumers and competition arising from such vertical integration. 84 For
example, the Commission extensively regulates cable television ventures
that combine content and conduit based on finding the potential for
competitive and consumer harm:
[W]e conclude that there are no good substitutes for some satellitedelivered vertically integrated programming and that such
programming therefore remains necessary for viable competition in
the video distribution market. Based on this finding, we conclude
that vertically integrated programmers continue to have the ability to
favor their affiliated cable operators over competitive MVPDs
[multichannel video programming distributors] such that competition
and diversity in the distribution of video programming would not be
preserved and protected absent the rule.... [W]e also find some
trends that increase their incentive to withhold programming, such as
the increase in horizontal consolidation of the cable industry, the

82. Rob Frieden, Internet Packet Sniffing and Its Impact on the Network Neutrality
Debate and the Balance of Power Between Intellectual Property Creators and Consumers,
18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J., 633, 644 (2008).
83. For background on how wireless carriers adversely impact the marketplace for
content, applications, and software by erecting walled gardens, see Rob Frieden, Lock
Down on the Third Screen: How Wireless Carriers Evade Regulation of Their Video
Services, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 819 (2009); Rob Frieden, Hold the Phone: Assessing
the Rights of Wireless Handset Owners and Carriers,69 U. PITT. L. REv. 675 (2008).
84. See Open Internet NPRM, supra note 1, at 13094 ("Where broadband Internet
access service providers have market power and are vertically integrated or affiliated with
content, application, or service providers, additional concerns may arise.").
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increase in cable clustering, and the recent emergence of new
competitors. We also find specific factual evidence that, where the
exclusive contract prohibition does not apply, such as in the case of
integrated
vertically
programming,
delivered
terrestrially
programmers have withheld and continue to withhold programming
from competitive MVPDs.85
Because cable television companies generate much of the desired
video content and control the major medium for distributing it, the FCC
has expressed concern8 6 that the cable companies can stifle competition,
extract rates above competitive levels from subscribers, favor affiliated
content providers, and prevent the development of new content sources.
Note, however, that the Commission does not subject independent, standalone content providers to such regulations.
D.

Discriminationat the Network Level Can Adversely Affect the
Degree of Competition, Innovation, and Investment in Applications
and Services that Run "Over the Top"

Just as the FCC has acted to prevent vertically integrated cable
television operators from thwarting video programming competition, the
Commission should use its Open Internet NPRM to establish rules that
safeguard competition for content, applications, and services that travel
via ("over the top") ISP network links. ISPs can exploit some of the
same gatekeeper roles as cable television operators by resorting to
tactics, masquerading as legitimate network management, that block,
delay, degrade, and otherwise interfere with end user access to content.87

85. In the Matter of Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992; Development of Competition and Diversity in Video
Programming Distribution: Section 628(c)(5) of the Communications Act: Sunset of
Exclusive Contract Prohibition; Review of the Commission's Program Access Rules and
Examination of Programming Tying Arrangements, 22 F.C.C.R. 17791, 17810 (2007).
86. See id. at 17816 ("Despite the increase in available programming over the past
five years, we find that cable operators still own popular programming for which there
are no close substitutes. The availability of new, non-integrated networks does not
mitigate the adverse impact on competition of a competitive MVPD's inability to access
popular vertically integrated programming. The record reflects that numerous national
programming networks, RSNs, premium programming networks, and VOD networks are
cable-affiliated programming networks that are demanded by MVPD subscribers and for
which there are no adequate substitutes.").
87. See Rob Frieden, Lies, Damn Lies and Statistics: Developing a Clearer
Assessment of Market Penetrationand Broadband Competition in the United States, 14
VA. J. L. & TECH., 100 (Summer, 2009), available at http://www.vjolt.net/voll4/issue2/
vl4i2_100%20-%20Frieden.pdf. (last visited June 17, 2010).
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Unlike the European Union,88 the FCC has not formally adopted the
Open System Interconnection 7 layer model to identify what Internet
functions constitute regulated and unregulated services. However, both
the Communications Act and the Commission's regulations calibrate the
scope of government oversight in a manner that parallels the OSI model
with extensive regulation primarily applied to facilities-based network
providers, in light of their significant market power over first and last
mile Internet access.
In contrast, the content and applications layers evidence no
marketplace concentration or lack of competitive options. So long as
ISPs do not interfere, consumers have complete sovereignty in selecting
what content, applications, and services to access. Unlike the network
level, where subscribers lock into one service provider, and may have
limited facilities-based operator options, the content/applications layers
evidence robust competition and boundless consumer choice. While
consumers may incur significant costs in changing which network
operator provides service, the switching costs at the applications and
content layers approach zero. Without constant innovation and acute
sensitivity to consumer wants, needs, and desires, a currently successful
content or applications provider is just one click away from declining
market share and insignificance.
Because the FCC has abandoned functional separation safeguards, 89
even as other nations embrace them as necessary and workable, 90 the
88. For background on the European Union's layered regulatory model, see Rob
Frieden, Adjusting the Horizontal and Vertical in Telecommunications Regulation: A
Comparison of the Traditionaland a New Layered Approach, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 207
(2003). See also John T. Nakahata, Regulating Information Platforms: The Challenge of
Rewriting Communications Regulation from the Bottom Up, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 95 (2002); Douglas C. Sicker & Joshua L. Mindel, Refinements of a Layered
Model for Telecommunications Policy, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69 (2002);
Philip J. Weiser, Law and Information Platforms, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1
(2002); Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 37, 39-40 (2002); Richard S. Whitt, A HorizontalLeap Forward:Formulatinga
New Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56
FED. COMM. L.J. 587 (2004).
89. In the Matters of Amendment to Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry) and Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for
Competitive Common Phase II Carrier Service and Facilities Authorizations Thereof
Communications Protocols under Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations, 2 F.C.C.R. 3072 (1987); Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry); and Policy and Rules
Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Service and Facilities Authorizations
Thereof Communications Protocols under Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules
and Regulations, Opinion and Order,3 F.C.C.R. 1135 (1988), 3 F.C.C.R. 1150 (1988), 4
F.C.C.R. 5927 (1989), rev'd California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990); on
remand, 5 F.C.C.R. 7719 (1990), 6 F.C.C.R.7571 (1991); Computer III Further Remand
Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision of Enhanced Services, 13 F.C.C.R.
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Commission relies heavily on ISP self-regulation and competitive
necessity to prevent content discrimination. Remarkably, while the FCC
remains skeptical about the viability of cable television self-regulation
and competition, the Commission may have overstated the level of true
facilities-based broadband Internet access competition.
In light of real or perceived broadband competition, the FCC has
undertaken an aggressive deregulatory campaign based on its
assumptions and statistical compilations that support an inference of
robust market penetration and competition in broadband markets.
Advocates for even more deregulation regularly cite the Commission's
statistics as evidence that the unfettered marketplace can achieve
broadband access and affordability goals as well as foreclose the need for
Internet regulation. 91 The prospect of regulating Internet-mediated
content, applications, and software juxtaposes with frequent FCC
conclusions that the consumers benefit from a robustly competitive and
unregulated Internet marketplace.92
6040 (1998), Computer III Further Remand Proceedings, 14 F.C.C.R. 4289 (1999), on
partialrecon., 14 F.C.C.R. 21628 (1999).
90. See Government of the United Kingdom, Office of Communications, The
International Communications Market 2007, Sec.1.3.6 Functional separation (Dec.
2007), available at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/research/cm/icmr07/overview/landscape/.
"Functional separation" complements these existing measures by placing the monopoly
element in a separate business unit. This allows any wholesale products and any
associated services to be offered to both the incumbent's own retail businesses and to
those of rivals, on equal terms. See Openreach, Keeping the UK Connected; available at
http://www.openreach.co.uk/orpg/aboutus/Downloads/web-corp_brochure.pdf.
91. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION
POLICY, FTC STAFF REPORT (June 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/

broadband/v070000report.pdf.
We note that opponents of net neutrality regulation have pointed to evidence on
a national scale that (1) access speeds are increasing, (2) prices (particularly
speed-adjusted or quality adjusted prices) are falling, and (3) new entrants,
including wireless and other competitors, are poised to challenge the incumbent
cable and telephone companies. We note, too, that statistical research
conducted by the FCC has tended to confirm these general trends.
Id. at 8. However, this report did acknowledge that "[b]ecause alternative broadband
providers are not perfect substitutes for cable or DSL broadband providers, the mere
counting of providers using new technologies does not answer the question of whether or
not they are effective competitive alternatives to cable and DSL." Id. at 104; see also J.
Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the
Internet, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & EcON. 349 (2006); Cabletechtalk, The Trouble with
Broadband Deployment Statistics, available at http://www.cabletechtalk.com/newsitems/2008/02/06/the-trouble-with-broadband-deployment-statistics/.
92. See AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation, Application for Transfer of Control,
22 F.C.C.R. 5662, 5724-25 (2007).
[T]here is substantial competition in the provision of Internet access services.
Broadband penetration has increased rapidly over the last year with more
Americans relying on high-speed connections to the Internet for access to news,
Increased penetration has been
entertainment, and communication.
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Both the FCC and many stakeholders assume the frequently cited
statistics present a true picture of the marketplace, but even the
Commission has acknowledged that its data collection, based on zip
codes, lacks granularity,93 and defining broadband using a floor of 200
kilobits per second understates the bit rate needed for many broadband
services.94 Rather than expand its regulatory mission to address phantom

accompanied by more vigorous competition. Greater competition limits the
ability of providers to engage in anticompetitive conduct since subscribers
would have the option of switching to alternative providers if their access to
content were blocked or degraded. In particular, cable providers collectively
continue to retain the largest share of the mass market high speed, Internet
access market. Additionally, consumers have gained access to more choice in
John Kneuer, Former Assistant Secretary for
broadband providers.").
Communications and Information and Administrator at the Commerce
Department's National Telecommunications and Information Administration
claimed in 2008 that the United States "has the most effective multiplatform
broadband in the world.
John Kneuer, True or False: U.S. 's Broadband Penetration Is Lower Than Even
Estonia's; Answer: True, NEWSWEEK, July 9, 2007, at 58, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/id/33456/page/2.
93. See Development of Nationwide Broadband Data to Evaluate Reasonable and
Timely Deployment of Advanced Services to All Americans, Improvement of Wireless
Broadband Subscribership Data, and Development of Data on Interconnected Voice Over
Internet Protocol (VoIP) Subscribership, 22 F.C.C.R. 7760 (2007).
In sparsely populated rural Zip Codes this could mean that a given provider has
just one broadband subscriber who is located in a small town or at some other
location convenient to telephone or cable facilities. Broadband "'availability'
could be non-existent for that carrier's other customers located a few blocks or
In other words, and
many miles away from that single customer.
notwithstanding the value of data currently submitted on the Form 477, there is
more precise information that we could gather to give us a more accurate
picture of current broadband deployment.
Id. at 7765-66. See also 23 F.C.C.R. 9691(2008), on recon., 23 F.C.C.R. 9800 (2008).
94. See Development of Nationwide Broadband Data to Evaluate Reasonable and
Timely Deployment of Advanced Services to All Americans, Improvement of Wireless
Broadband Subscribership Data, and Development of Data on Interconnected Voice Over
Internet Protocol (VoIP) Subscribership, 23 F.C.C.R. 9691 (2008).
As many commenters noted, the range of information transfer capacities
included in the current lowest tier of 200 kbps to 2.5 mbps captures a wide
variety of services, ranging from services capable of transmitting real time
video to simple always-on connections not suitable for more than basic email or
web browsing activities. We find that requiring providers to report data in
more detailed speed tiers will better identify services that support advanced
applications, creating distinctions that reflect different capacities for
transmitting high quality video and similar high bandwidth communications.
We also find that, as technologies and services evolve, upload speeds are an
increasingly significant aspect of broadband services, and increased granularity
in reporting both download and upload speed data will assist us in
understanding the broadband services market.
Id. at 9700, on recon., 23 F.C.C.R. 9800 (2008); see also Rob Frieden, Lies, Damn Lies
and Statistics: Developing a Clearer Assessment of Market Penetration and Broadband
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issues related to upstream providers of content, the Commission would
better allocate its time and resources to resolving real Internet access
problems.
Regardless of whether consumers have multiple broadband options
available, most subscribe to, and are locked into the services of only one
carrier. In the case of wireless broadband access, consumers typically
agree to one or two year service contracts with financial penalties for
early termination. For both wireline and wireless broadband access,
subscribers may not have many service options and may incur significant
switching costs should they learn of discriminatory service. But as the
Commission stated in its investigation of Comcast, 9 5 subscribers may not
easily detect the source of service degradation even when the underlying
carrier engages in anticompetitive conduct.
V.

AMPLE CASE LAW FORECLOSES THE FCC FROM LEVERAGING A
PUBLIC INTEREST ARGUMENT TO REGULATE CONTENT AND
APPLICATION PROVIDERS

Providers of content and applications, having no affiliation with
downstream ISPs, 9 6 qualify for maximum protection from FCC
regulation based on traditional First Amendment analysis and the lack of
any basis for the Commission to apply the information service
classification which it has used to justify selective regulatory
intervention. In Reno v. ACL U,97 the Supreme Court considered the
Internet a vast medium for the publication of content worthy of
substantial protection from government regulation even when
government presents a compelling reason for intervening, e.g., protecting
children from the potential harm resulting from access to obscene or
indecent material.9 8 On several occasions, the Internet's importance as a
Competition in the United States, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 100 (2009), available at
http://www.vjolt.net/voll4/issue2/vl4i2_100%20-%20Frieden.pdf.
95. Comcast Investigation, supra note 75, at 13058-59 (2008) ("Many consumers
experiencing difficulty using only certain applications will not place blame on the
broadband Internet access service provider, where it belongs, but rather on the
applications themselves, thus further disadvantaging those applications in the
marketplace.").
96. ISPs that package content in a walled garden have claimed First Amendment
speaker status even as these carriers also profess to be nothing more than neutral
conduits, particularly when they can qualify for a "safe harbor" exemption from tort and
copyright liability. See Rob Frieden, Invoking and Avoiding the FirstAmendment: How
Internet Service ProvidersLeverage Their Status as Both Content Creators and Neutral
No. 1 (2010), available at
J. CONST. L.,
U. PA.
Conduits, 12
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1425138 (draft).
97. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
98. The Supreme Court considers Internet communications as a publishing activity
and therefore a core element of First Amendment speaker/publisher rights. "Any person
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mass medium of expression trumped legislative efforts to protect
children from harmful Internet-mediated content. 99 These cases offer
clear precedent mandating close scrutiny of content-based regulations
with government bearing a substantial burden of demonstrating that
content-affecting regulations are narrowly drawn and do not unduly
restrict First Amendment protected rights of both content providers and
consumers.00

The Supreme Court has not imposed such a high burden on
government when seeking to regulate other media such as cable
television and broadcasting.'0 1 First, the Court has evidenced greater
willingness to consider regulation in terms of achieving economic public
policy goals as opposed to whether and how they affect speech. The
Court accepted the duty to balance speaker rights against other public
policy objectives such as promoting widespread access to certain types of
media, e.g., commercial, advertiser-supported broadcasting. Second, the
Court has acknowledged that media have different characteristics that
affect accessibility and competitiveness.
Unlike the Internet, which heretofore has evidenced low barriers to
market entry by content providers, other media have higher market entry
barriers, e.g., the need to install costly infrastructure, or to secure a
government-granted franchise or license to use public spectrum and
rights of way. For these types of media, courts will examine laws that
require FCC interpretation and the creation of regulations in the broader
context of supporting public policy goals, especially ones articulated by
or organization with a computer connected to the Internet can 'publish' information." Id.
at 853.
99. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (holding that prohibition of
commercial transmission of material harmful to minors was unconstitutionally overbroad
when less restrictive alternatives, such as filtering, are readily available).
100. The Supreme Court also stated:
The dramatic expansion of this new marketplace of ideas contradicts the factual
basis of this contention. The record demonstrates that the growth of the
As a matter of
Internet has been and continues to be phenomenal.
constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume
that governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere
with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The interest in
encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any
theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.
Reno, 521 U.S. at 885.
101. "[U]nlike the Internet, the broadcast medium has traditionally 'received the most
limited First Amendment protection."' Complaints Against Various Licensees Regarding
Their Broadcast of the Fox Television Network Program "Married By America" on April
7, 2003, Forfeiture Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 3222 n.74 (2008) (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at
867). In the Reno case, which addressed the lawfulness of Internet content regulation
designed to protect children from harm, the Court supported maximum First Amendment
freedom for Internet-based speakers as compared to the comparatively less freedom
available to broadcasters. See generally id.
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Congress, as opposed to a narrower view that the resulting regulations
directly affect content and the rights of a particular type of speaker, e.g.,
cable network operators versus television broadcasters.
The FCC has attempted to frame its regulation of ISPs as having no
First Amendment consequences whatsoever. By avoiding any First
Amendment analysis, the FCC does not have to address whether any
form of Internet regulation impacts content providers and their speaker
rights. Such avoidance also supports the FCC's goal of having
maximum flexibility to justify regulatory forbearance in most instances,
but conversely to apply selective regulation on an as needed basis, even
for information service providers. This pursuit of regulatory options
supports the FCC's predisposition not to regulate the Internet while
nevertheless reserving the right to do so whenever the Commission
deems it necessary, despite the First Amendment and case law precedent
that clearly prohibits such government intervention. While the FCC
might be able to leverage Title I ancillary jurisdiction to regulate ISPs
under compelling circumstances, the Commission has no lawful means to
extend such jurisdiction upstream to content providers.
When confronted with ISP claims that FCC regulation thwarts their
First Amendment speaker rights, the Commission has sought to frame
the matter as lawful extension of a regulatory mandate that has no impact
on anyone's First Amendment freedom:
Nor do we find Time Warner Cable's analogy of a broadband
provider to a newspaper to be apt. For one, the Commission is not
dictating the content of any speech. Nor are we persuaded that
Comcast's customers would attribute the content delivered by peerto-peer applications to Comcast, rather than attributing them to the
other parties with whom they have chosen to interact through those
applications. Under these circumstances, we find that our actions do
102
not raise First Amendment concerns.
The Commission may ignore the First Amendment implications of ISP
regulation, but it surely must appreciate that "the other parties with
03
whom [consumers] have chosen to interact through those applications"'
do qualify for First Amendment protection from expanding government
oversight.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Consistent with the FCC's examination of potential Internet
regulatory issues, including the Open Internet NPRM, the network
102. See Comcast Investigation, supra note 75, at 13053 n.203.
103. Id.
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neutrality debate has focused on ISPs and their relationship downstream
to end users and upstream to content, application, and service providers.
While stakeholders and researchers differ significantly about whether
and how the Commission should act, the debate never has included
whether the Commission should become a content regulator. No one can
credibly claim that the FCC has to remedy some public harm in what has
become a quite robust marketplace of ideas. The public harm exists at
the ISP level where manipulation of packets can occur leading to
potential harm to the marketplace of ideas upstream.
End users have unlimited choices of options, subject to downstream
constraints imposed by ISPs. Legitimate ISP network management can
and should address instances where specific types of content and
applications can cause harm to networks, or to individual consumers.
But the need to protect a network from spain and congestion, as well as
the desire to protect individual subscribers from harmful content, does
not elevate either an ISP or the FCC into a position of censor and content
regulator.
The FCC should take affirmative steps to regulate ISPs in their
capacity as gatekeepers, bottleneck operators, and intermediaries. The
Commission should operate as a referee able to resolve disputes and to
determine, based on compulsory traffic reports and its own investigative
powers, whether congestion and legitimate network management, or
deliberate and unnecessary meddling of subscribers' traffic has resulted
in service degradation. The FCC should not permit ISPs to drop
subscribers' traffic packets to achieve anticompetitive objectives.
However, legitimate network management, national security and tiering
of customer service might justify some type of quality of service and
price discrimination. 10 4
The proper and lawful concern about end user access to the Internet
via ISPs does not justify a further extension of regulatory oversight to
include content and applications. Doing so would reduce the individual
and societal benefits that accrue from an open, innovative, and robustly
competitive marketplace for Internet-mediated content and applications.
The network neutrality debate seems to encourage provocateurs to
raise and legitimize outlandish interpretations of law and policy. The
FCC inadvertently may have contributed to confusion and uncertainty
104. See Rob Frieden, Keeping the Internet Neutral?: A Response to the Wu-Yoo
Debate, 59 FED. COMM.
L. J. 621,
Forum
(2007),
available at
http://www.1aw.indiana.edu/fcj/pubs/forum/ Frieden_v59i3-forum.pdf; Internet 3.0: Rob
Frieden, Identifying Problems and Solutions to the Network Neutrality Debate, 1 INT'L J.
COMM. 461-492 (2007), available at http://www.ijoc.org//ojs/index.php/ijoc/
article/view/l60/86; Rob Frieden, Network Neutrality or Bias?-Handicappingthe Odds
for a Tiered andBranded Internet, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 171-216 (2007).

82

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115:1

simply by acting on AT&T's invitation to consider extending Internet
policies to content, applications, and service providers. The Commission
can contribute to clarity and certainty by expressly confirming that its
jurisdiction is limited to matters pertaining to Internet access and the
telecommunications services delivered by ISPs.

